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NCAA AMATEURISM AND ATHLETICS: A PERFECT 
MARRIAGE OR A DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP?–AN 
ANTITRUST APPROACH TO STUDENT-ATHLETE 
COMPENSATION 
Edward H. Grimmett

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the allegations surrounding Johnny Manziel, a National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Heisman Trophy winner, 
the ongoing debate regarding student-athlete compensation is reach-
ing new heights.1  Manziel allegedly received improper benefits in 
exchange for his autograph and was suspended for the first half of 
Texas A&M’s season opener for an “inadvertent violation of NCAA 
rules.”2  Manziel’s notoriety and the nature of his alleged scandal act-
ed as a spark in the debate over whether student-athletes should re-
ceive compensation.  The NCAA and its member institutions gener-
ate billions of dollars through television revenue.3  Additionally, the 
NCAA and its licensing affiliate, The Collegiate Licensing Company 
(“CLC”), procure large profits through the licensing of the names and 
images of student-athletes.4  Meanwhile, the products that the NCAA 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Sports Man-
agement, St. John’s University.  I would first like to thank both my parents and my brother, 
Joey, for their support throughout my life and all of the patience they displayed during my 
work on this Comment.  I would also like to thank my Faculty Advisor, Professor Rena 
Seplowitz, for her insight and assistance on this topic.  Lastly, I would like to thank Brandon 
Maharajh and Jason Prince for their guidance on this Comment and the tremendous gener-
osity they have demonstrated throughout law school. 
1 Tom Fornelli, Johnny Manziel suspended for first half of Rice game, CBSSPORTS.COM 
(Aug. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-
football/23366173/johnny-manziel-suspended-for-first-half-of-rice-game.   
2 Id. 
3 Pete Thamel, With Big Paydays at Stake, College Teams Scramble for a Spot, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/ncaafootball/in-
conference-realignment-colleges-run-to-paydaylight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
4 See Michael Smith, Collegiate licensing explodes in CLC’s 30 years, SPORTS BUS. 
DAILY GLOBAL J. (Jun. 13, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011 
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relies on, its student athletes, are only entitled to receive full-athletic 
scholarships for their contribution to intercollegiate athletics.5 
The NCAA, a non-profit organization, states in its bylaws that 
its non-compensation policy is imperative to maintain amateurism in 
collegiate athletics.6  However, this policy leads to improper practices 
that require the NCAA to penalize its member institutions.  One ex-
ample is the sanctions that have been imposed on member schools for 
providing benefits to student-athletes during the recruiting process.7  
Recently, an investigation of a Miami booster, Nevin Shapiro, re-
vealed that Shapiro provided improper benefits to at least seventy-
two University of Miami student-athletes.8  Shapiro stated that he 
gave money, cars, jewelry, and many other gifts to the athletes.9  
Providing a uniform system of compensating athletes could deter im-
proper inducements, which affect fair competition among member in-
stitutions. 
Along with the billions of dollars that the NCAA receives for 
its television broadcasts, a large part of its revenue is attributed to 
collegiate licensing.10  The NCAA’s member institutions license their 
collegiate jerseys to big-time apparel companies, such as Nike and 
Under Armour.11  These companies are granted the rights to sell the 
school’s jersey, which supposedly features a “random” number.12  Jay 
Bilas, an ESPN college basketball analyst, made a shocking revela-
tion that required the NCAA to take immediate action.13  Bilas re-
vealed that these jerseys were searchable by player name, although 
 
/06/13/Colleges/CLC-at-30.aspx (“[T]he collegiate licensing industry has become a $4.3 bil-
lion business in annual retail sales.  About 60 percent of it comes from apparel sales.”). 
5 Josh Levin, The Most Evil Thing About College Sports, SLATE (May 17, 2012, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/05/ncaa_scholarship_rules_it_s_morall
y_indefensible_that_athletic_scholarships_can_be_yanked_after_one_year_for_any_reason_
.html. 
6 JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 15 (2006). 
7 Miami booster says improper benefits given to now-NFL players, NFL.COM (Aug. 16, 
2011, 9:16 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d8218456f/article/miami-booster-
says-improper-benefits-given-to-nownfl-players. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Smith, supra note 4. 
11 Id. 
12 Richard Deitsch, Jay Bilas Clowns the NCAA, NBC’s Premier League plans, more, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11, 2013, 9:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/ 
20130811/jay-bilas-nbc-premier-league-deitsch/. 
13 Id. 
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no surname is present on the jersey.14  Therefore, searching “Johnny 
Manziel jersey” directs users to Texas A&M’s website and displays a 
jersey bearing his number. 
Bilas’s discovery could provide an avenue for student-athletes 
to receive compensation through the right of publicity.  States have 
enacted right of publicity statutes to protect the misappropriation of 
an individual’s image.15  Using a player’s number on the jersey of his 
corresponding school is arguably a misappropriation in itself.  More-
over, the student-athletes’ claims are even stronger if the NCAA and 
its members have purchased the keywords to make the jerseys 
searchable by the players’ names on their websites. 
Despite the unauthorized use of these athletes’ likenesses, the 
argument remains that student-athletes receive sufficient compensa-
tion through academic scholarships.  One proponent of this argument 
is Sports Illustrated writer Seth Davis, who stated, “[s]tudent-athletes 
earn free tuition, which over the course of four years can exceed 
$200,000.”16  Although this is a valid argument, that compensation 
does not seem adequate in comparison to the billions of dollars the 
NCAA generates.  Student-athletes, on average, spend approximately 
eighty hours per week performing their athletic and academic respon-
sibilities.17  Thus, student-athletes do not have much time to receive 
compensation through employment opportunities.  Regardless of stu-
dent-athletes’ inability to obtain part-time jobs, the NCAA places 
strict regulations on outside employment that, which limits the 
amount of money a college athlete may receive.18  Nevertheless, the 
strongest argument for college athletes is that their scholarship can be 
rescinded at any time, without cause.19 
 
14 Id. 
15 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (“According to the Re-
statement [(Second) of Torts (1977)], [o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another is subject to liability”) (internal quotations omitted).  The right 
of publicity was enacted in order “to protect the property interest that an individual gains and 
enjoys in his identity through his labor and effort.”  Id. 
16 Levin, supra note 5. 
17 RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION HEIST: ROBBING COLLEGE 
ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 9 (2012), available at 
http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-Heist-Study_Full.pdf (providing that in a round 
table discussion with Congress, NBA basketball player, Shane Battier, stated that college 
athletics are more demanding than professional athletics). 
18 Kathryn Young, Deconstructing the Façade of Amateurism: Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Arguments in Favor of Compensating Athletes, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 338, 
353 (2013). 
19 Levin, supra note 5. 
3
Grimmett: NCAA Amateurism and Athletics
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
826 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
This Comment addresses whether the NCAA may restrict the 
use of student-athletes’ likenesses under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, which prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade.20  Edward 
O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball player, is currently litigating 
this issue.21  The NCAA has been subject to antitrust scrutiny for a 
variety of reasons,22 but an unfavorable decision regarding student-
athlete compensation may have a lasting effect on the landscape of 
the NCAA. 
As case law indicates, the NCAA’s role as a regulatory body 
acts as a shield from antitrust liability.23  The NCAA has the respon-
sibility of preserving the amateur status of its athletes, which justifies 
many of its regulations that restrict competition.24  However, as the 
NCAA’s economic power grows, restraints on student-athletes appear 
increasingly unreasonable.  By amending its bylaws, the NCAA 
could reward student-athletes for their contributions to intercollegiate 
athletics.  Furthermore, the NCAA would not harm its fundamental 
principle of amateurism if restrictions were placed on the amount a 
student-athlete could receive for the use of his or her image.  If the 
maximum amount a student-athlete could earn does not exceed the 
costs associated with attending the institution, amateurism would not 
be harmed because the compensation would still relate to an educa-
 
20 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984). 
21 O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
22 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88 (alleging that the NCAA’s restriction on televised foot-
ball games was an antitrust violation); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(alleging that the NCAA’s eligibility regulations, which prohibited a student-athlete from 
competing while enrolled in a graduate program were an antitrust violation); Law v. NCAA, 
134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998) (alleging that the NCAA’s restriction on college bas-
ketball coaches’ salaries was an antitrust violation). 
23 Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding the NCAA’s sanc-
tions of the University of Arizona, the court reasoned that “it is clear that the NCAA is now 
engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity.  One type . . . is rooted in the NCAA’s 
concern for protection of amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a dis-
cernable economic purpose”); Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that regulations that preserve 
amateurism are non-commercial in nature); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 
317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (D. Pa. 2004) (relying on Smith, the court held that recruiting rules 
were implemented to preserve amateurism and were exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Basset 
v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (recruiting rules forbidding improper induce-
ments and academic violations are non-commercial). 
24 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02.  The Court explained that the NCAA markets a 
unique product because sports coupled with academic tradition make the product more popu-
lar.  Id.  The NCAA must play a vital role in preserving the amateur status of its players in 
order for the product to remain available.  Id. 
4
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tional purpose. 
In this Comment, Section II concentrates on the history of the 
NCAA and its evolution as a regulatory body.  Section III focuses on 
how the courts interpret Section 1 of the Sherman Act in relation to 
claims against the NCAA.  When applying the Act, the courts must 
choose whether to adopt a Rule of Reason or a per se analysis; this 
section explains why a Rule of Reason analysis is more appropriate 
in an action against the NCAA.  Section IV examines the various an-
titrust claims that have been brought against the NCAA.  The case 
law illustrates obstacles that a claimant faces when bringing an action 
against the NCAA.  Section V provides an in-depth analysis of how 
potential issues confronting the NCAA may be resolved pursuant to 
antitrust principles, and how the NCAA may compensate student-
athletes while preserving amateurism. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NCAA 
As Kay Hawes, a former NCAA employee, once wrote, the 
NCAA’s “father was football and its mother was higher education.”25  
Little did he know, the marriage would result in a dysfunctional rela-
tionship.  The NCAA is a non-profit entity that acts as a regulator of 
amateur athletics and works closely with its member universities to 
promote excellence in athletics as well as academics.26  A back-
ground of the NCAA illuminates the issues that the institution faces 
in the realm of antitrust litigation. 
A. Formation 
Intercollegiate sports were born in 1852 when Harvard and 
Yale competed in a rowing match.27  The need for an organized body 
in intercollegiate athletics became apparent as other sports began to 
emerge and the lack of formal regulations resulted in serious injuries 
to players.28  The gruesome nature of football led to the decision of 
many universities to discontinue the sport, but student groups ran the 
programs that remained.29  These groups were not concerned with the 
 
25 CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 7. 
26 Id. at 15. 
27 Id. at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 3-4. 
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amateurism of student-athletes because they often hired non-students 
to compete.30  Consequently, President Theodore Roosevelt sum-
moned collegiate athletic leaders to two separate White House con-
ferences in order to encourage the reform of intercollegiate athlet-
ics.31  In response to the White House meetings, in 1906, sixty-two 
college institutions became members of the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States, which officially became the NCAA 
in 1910.32 
The NCAA established itself as a non-profit organization with 
amateurism acting as the foundation.33  However, initially, the NCAA 
did not have a significant administrative role.34  That authority was 
entrusted to its member institutions to enforce the principles and rules 
set out in NCAA bylaws.35  The need for NCAA authority grew in 
the 1920s when the first college football game was broadcasted and 
the first championship was held for track and field.36  As more 
NCAA championships developed, additional rule committees were 
necessary, which sparked the shift of authority from the member in-
stitutions to the NCAA.37 
B. Growth and Evolution of the NCAA 
Membership grew progressively in the 1930s and 1940s, and 
by the time the NCAA elected its first executive director, Walter 
Byers, in 1951, nearly 400 institutions and conferences belonged to 
the NCAA.38  As more institutions became involved and the nation’s 
interest increased, concern developed regarding the athletic-eligibility 
and amateurism of student-athletes.39  The exponential growth of the 
NCAA resulted in substantial differences in size, ambition, and com-
plexity among athletic programs, which required the NCAA to step in 
as a regulatory body.40  However, the authority granted to the NCAA 
 
30 CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 4. 
31 Id. at 9-10. 
32 Id. at 10. 
33 Id. at 15. 
34 Id. 
35 CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 15. 
36 Id. at 23-24. 
37 Id. at 31. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 CROWLEY, supra note 6, at 37. 
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has frequently attracted antitrust scrutiny. 
As television emerged as the prominent broadcasting medium, 
Byers believed it would have a negative effect on in-game attend-
ance.41  In order to maintain attendance records, Byers implemented a 
program that limited the total number of televised intercollegiate 
football games.42  In 1985, the validity of Byers’s television plan was 
the basis of the antitrust suit brought before the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents.43  The 
Court held that the restriction on televised sporting events had a sig-
nificant anticompetitive effect among broadcasters in the market and, 
therefore, was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.44  The 
Court reasoned “that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of 
member institutions to respond to consumer preferences, the NCAA 
has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athlet-
ics in the Nation’s life.”45  This decision has spurred competition 
among broadcasters and has resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
price for NCAA television rights. 
At the time of Board of Regents, each broadcasting network 
agreed to pay participating member institutions a minimum aggregate 
compensation of $131,750,000 over a four-year period.46  Thirty 
years later, television contracts with the NCAA and its member insti-
tutions have increased at a shocking rate.  In 2010, the NCAA an-
nounced a 14-year, $10.8 billion contract with Turner Broadcasting 
and CBS to televise the NCAA basketball tournament.47  Further-
more, the NCAA recently struck a deal with ESPN for its newly im-
plemented playoff system that will replace the BCS Championship in 
college football.48 The contract is a 12-year deal that will begin in the 
2015-2016 season, and it will pay the NCAA approximately $470 
million a year for the broadcast rights to only three games.49 
 
41 Id. at 38. 
42 Id. at 39. 
43 468 U.S. 85, 87 (1984). 
44 Id. at 120. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 92-93. 
47 Steve Berkowitz, Parts of NCAA’s TV contract with CBS, Turner go public, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 16, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2012/10/16/n 
caa-tournament-turner-cbs-contract/1637179/. 
48 Jerry Hinnen, ESPN reaches 12-year deal to air college football playoffs, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Nov. 21, 2012, 2:03 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-
on-college-football/21083689/espn-reaches-12year-deal-to-air-college-football-playoffs. 
49 Id. 
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The economic growth of the NCAA is alarming because of its 
impact on the activity of its member institutions.  Currently, college 
football is composed of eleven conferences and one group of inde-
pendent schools.50  Recently, schools have left their conference when 
a superior financial opportunity has presented itself.51  With their 
economic wellbeing at stake, schools want to belong to a premier ath-
letic conference, which generates the most television revenue.52  For 
instance, Texas University, a member of the Big 12, a premier con-
ference, formed its own television network with ESPN that will gross 
approximately $15 million annually for the University.53  The Pac-12, 
another conference with regional dominance, signed a 12-year, $3 
billion contract with ESPN, which will be split among the members 
of the conference.54  Syracuse University and the University of Pitts-
burgh, longtime members of the Big East, recently joined the Atlantic 
Coast Conference in order to capitalize on the money available 
through college football.55  Although conference realignment has 
provided certain institutions with more economic flexibility, it has al-
so eliminated longtime rivalries in basketball and football.  This 
opens up the question of whether the priority of the NCAA and its 
member institutions is to preserve the wellbeing of amateur student-
athletes or to benefit economically. 
With regard to this issue, Edward O’Bannon, a former UCLA 
basketball player, has brought a class-action antitrust suit against the 
NCAA.56  The complaint alleges that the NCAA unreasonably re-
stricted competition by fixing the players’ income at “zero” for the 
use of their names and likenesses.57  Therefore, the plaintiffs contend 
that student-athletes should have the right to pursue compensation for 
the notoriety they have gained as result of their collegiate athletic ca-
 
50 Mike Bostock, Tracing the History of N.C.A.A. Conferences, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/11/30/football-conferences/ (providing a chart 
that displays all of the massive changes that occurred recently to the NCAA’s conference 
structure). 
51 Thamel, supra note 3. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 09-1967 CW) [hereinafter O’Bannon 
Complaint]. 
57 O’Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *5. 
8
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reers.58  The plaintiffs argue that the prohibition of this right is an un-
reasonable restraint on trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  Electronic Arts Inc. (“EA”) and the Collegiate Licens-
ing Company (“CLC”), which were also part of the lawsuit, recently 
settled with the players, but the NCAA contends that it is willing to 
continue litigating the issue.59 
The NCAA’s defense is predicated on the fundamental prin-
ciples enunciated in its bylaws.60  The NCAA stresses the importance 
of its role as a regulator of amateur athletics and its duty to imple-
ment regulations to ensure its preservation.61  Therefore, the re-
strictions placed on student-athletes serve the purpose of maintaining 
a clear distinction between professional and amateur athletics.62  De-
spite the NCAA’s tenacity to continue litigation, an unfavorable ver-
dict would have a profound effect on its future because it would be 
required to share a percentage of its revenue with student-athletes.63  
It is possible that a substantial portion of the NCAA’s collegiate li-
censing and television revenue could shift into the student-athletes’ 
hands.64  Changes have already begun to materialize as EA Sports 
will no longer produce the NCAA College Football video game and 
the NCAA will no longer sell players’ jerseys on its website.65  Until 
this case reaches a resolution, the future relationship between the 
NCAA and its student-athletes will remain uncertain. 
 
58 Id. 
59 Michael McCann, O’Bannon settles with EA and CLC, NCAA still remaining, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Sep. 26, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/new 
s/20130926/mccann-obannon-ea-clc-settlement/. 
60 O’Bannon, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19170, at *3.  The NCAA requires student-athletes to 
sign Form 08-3a, which allows the NCAA to use players’ names to generally promote the 
NCAA championship or other events.  Id.  A member institution or recognized entity may 
also use an athlete’s name, picture, or appearance to support its charitable or educational ac-
tivities, or to support activities considered incidental to the student-athlete participation in 
intercollegiate athletics under bylaw Article 12.5.1.1.  Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Steve Berkowitz, Judge lets class-action efforts in O’Bannon case go on, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 30, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/01/30/ncaa-
obannon-players-lawsuit-name-and-likeness/1877031/. 
64 Id. 
65 McCann, supra note 59; Terrance Harris, Ed O’Bannon Antitrust Lawsuit has Serious 
Implication for Student-Athletes, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:23 AM), http://www.no 
la.com/tulane/index.ssf/2013/08/ed_obannon_antitrust_lawsuit_h.html. 
9
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III. NCAA AND SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
The NCAA has virtually no competitors in the market of ama-
teur athletics, which seems to violate the basic principles of the 
Sherman Act.  The legislative history delineates that Congress passed 
the law to restrain mergers among competitors.66  Congress’s concern 
was that these combinations could weaken competition in the market, 
leaving the merged business with complete market power.67  Howev-
er, the NCAA’s market is more ambiguous when analyzing an anti-
trust claim because it is an organization of members that compete 
with one another.  How the courts deal with distinct markets, such as 
the NCAA’s, is addressed in this section. 
In order to have a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that there was a contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained 
trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analy-
sis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.”68  Some 
restraints on competition may be justifiable to achieve a specific pur-
pose; therefore, the Act condemns “only unreasonable restraints of 
trade.”69  This creates a challenge for student-athletes, who must es-
tablish that the NCAA bylaws they adhere to create an unreasonable 
restraint on trade despite the NCAA’s justifiable reasons for enforc-
ing them. 
Although the restriction on student-athletes was not in contro-
versy in Board of Regents, the Court stressed the importance of the 
NCAA’s regulations and established a strong foundation for future 
antitrust claimants.70  Justice Stevens, in dicta, expressed the im-
portance of the NCAA’s task as a regulatory body to preserve the 
amateur and academic status of student-athletes, as well as maintain 
competitive balance among member institutions.71  The Court noted, 
 
66 Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 
F.3d 328, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers from injury that results 
from diminished competition.”)). 
67 See id. (holding that not all monopolies are per se illegal).  If the court believes that an 
entity is justified in restricting competition, then it will analyze whether that restriction is 
unreasonable.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. 
68 Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d at 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bhan 
v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
69 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98. 
70 Id. at 101-02. 
71 Id. 
10
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“[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of 
the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among ama-
teur athletic teams.”72  Therefore, most courts look at whether the 
regulation has an effect on amateurism or fair competition when ana-
lyzing NCAA restraints on competition. 
A. Rule of Reason Analysis 
Most courts adopt a Rule of Reason analysis in claims involv-
ing the NCAA because, as a regulator of amateur athletics, the 
NCAA possesses justifiable means to restrict competition.73  A re-
straint on competition is unreasonable under a Rule of Reason analy-
sis if “the restraint’s harm to competition outweighs its 
procompetitive effects.”74  Therefore, the initial burden is on the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the restraint has an anticompetitive effect 
within a “relevant market.”75  If the plaintiff can make a sufficient 
showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a 
procompetitive justification.76 
If the plaintiff can establish a presumption of anticompetitive 
conduct, the NCAA will most likely be able to rebut this presump-
tion.  As a non-profit entity, the NCAA’s purpose is to promote aca-
demics, amateurism, and competitive balance among student-athletes.  
In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens noted the importance of the 
NCAA’s role in preserving amateurism by stating, “[i]n order to pre-
serve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be 
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”77  Therefore, the 
NCAA’s legitimate reason behind its regulatory measures acts as a 
 
72 Id. at 117. 
73 Id. (“Our decision not to apply a per se rule to this case rests in large part on our recog-
nition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that peti-
tioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved.”).  The courts employ 
both a per se rule and the Rule of Reason analysis to come to a consensus regarding the ex-
tent of a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.  A per se rule 
is employed when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the defendant’s anticom-
petitive conduct is so great that no further analysis is necessary.  Id. at 103-04. 
74 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. California, 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston, 
101 F.3d at 1018). 
75 Id. (citing Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (con-
tending that in order to ascertain whether the proper relevant market has been established, 
the court analyzes the geographic region where a consumer can turn to an alternate source 
for the product)). 
76 Id. 
77 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. 
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shield against prospective antitrust violations.78 
B. Per Se Analysis 
Courts will rarely apply a per se rule against the NCAA, un-
less there is no regulatory measure apparent.79  Courts apply a per se 
rule when “the practice facially appears to be one that would always 
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”80  
This analysis differs from a Rule of Reason analysis because a re-
straint is facially presumed unreasonable.81  As a non-profit entity, 
the NCAA imposes a myriad of regulatory controls to administer its 
ideals, creating a justifiable reason behind restricting competition.  
Applying a per se rule against the NCAA would require its actions to 
be facially unreasonable, which is unlikely because its regulations 
serve the purpose of preserving amateur athletics. 
If the NCAA were to lose its non-profit status, however, the 
consequences would be devastating.  It would open the floodgates to 
antitrust litigation and require the courts to apply a per se standard 
because there would be no purpose behind its regulations.  In 2006, 
Congress questioned the NCAA’s tax-exempt status as a non-profit 
entity.82  The Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, Bill Thomas, sent a letter to the NCAA president expressing 
concern with lucrative television contracts, the increase in coaches’ 
salaries, and the effect these practices have had on college athletics’ 
commitment to higher education.83  Thomas wrote that the activities 
member institutions undertake as educational organizations clearly 
reflect their tax-exempt status; however, “[t]he exempt purpose of in-
tercollegiate athletics . . . is less apparent, particularly in the context 
of major college football and men’s basketball programs.”84  The 
NCAA still stands as a non-profit entity, but as its revenues continue 
 
78 Id. at 117. 
79 See id. (contending that the Supreme Court in Board of Regents reversed the Court of 
Appeals’ decision because it employed a per se rule and found that a Rule of Reason analysis 
was appropriate because most of the regulatory controls that the NCAA enforces are a justi-
fiable means for hindering competition). 
80 Id. at 100 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1979)). 
81 Id. 
82 Steve Wieberg, NCAA’s tax-exempt status questioned, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2006, 2:40 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2006-10-04-ncaa-tax-status_x.htm. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
12
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to rise at an exponential rate, Congress’s concern regarding its tax-
exempt status will only increase. 
IV. BARRIERS TO BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE 
SHERMAN ACT 
When the NCAA acts in its regulatory capacity, it strengthens 
its product and, therefore, enhances competition.  Accordingly, the 
major challenge an antitrust claimant faces is demonstrating that a 
regulation is unreasonable when it serves the purpose of preserving 
amateurism, promoting education, and maintaining competitive bal-
ance.85  Most courts follow the dichotomy enumerated in Board of 
Regents, in which an unreasonable restraint on competition is 
weighed against the NCAA’s fiduciary duty to its student-athletes.86  
The Supreme Court expressed the importance of many of the 
NCAA’s regulatory controls, which often shield the NCAA from an-
titrust scrutiny when it is acting in a regulatory manner.87  The Su-
preme Court, as well as many lower courts, suggest that an antitrust 
violation has occurred if a regulation constrains, rather than enhanc-
es, intercollegiate athletics.88 
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents was the first to ad-
dress the issue inherent in applying an antitrust claim to a collegiate 
sports organization.  The Court reasoned that the NCAA places a hor-
izontal restraint on trade because it consists of member institutions, 
which agree on rules that restrict the way in which they compete 
against one another.
 89  Thus, in order to ascertain the reasonableness 
 
85 See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185; see, e.g., Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (“Because the 
sanctions evince no anticompetitive purpose, are reasonably related to the association’s cen-
tral objectives, and are not overbroad, the NCAA’s action does not constitute an unreasona-
ble restraint under the Sherman Act.”); see, e.g., Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433. 
86 See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 187. 
87 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. 
88 See, e.g., id. at 104 (“[T]he essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the 
challenged restraint enhances competition.”).  The Court held that the NCAA’s regulation, 
which limited the number of games that could be televised, violated the Sherman Act be-
cause it restricted, rather than enhanced, intercollegiate athletics for all of its viewers.  Id. at 
120; see also Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (“the [eligibility] bylaw at issue here is a reasonable 
restraint which furthers the NCAA’s goal of fair competition”).  Because the challenged reg-
ulation enhanced intercollegiate athletics by ensuring fair competition, the bylaw survived 
antitrust scrutiny.  Id.; see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (stating that recruiting regulations 
that result in the sanctioning of member institutions are not an antitrust violation, because 
they enhance intercollegiate athletics by ensuring fair competition). 
89 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 
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of the restriction, the Court must gauge the effect the restriction has 
on the operation of a free market.90  This could prove to be challeng-
ing for an antitrust claimant because if substitute products are availa-
ble, it will expand the contested market, making a restraint on trade 
less likely.91  Nevertheless, the Court determined that college football 
was the relevant market because of the effect the restriction had on 
the operation of broadcasters.92  The Court found that college football 
provides a unique product to advertisers and the horizontal restraint 
placed on the product eliminated competition among broadcasters in 
the market.93  This section addresses, in more detail, the specific chal-
lenges that exist when bringing a claim against the NCAA and how 
these challenges can possibly be overcome. 
A. NCAA’s Pro-Competitive Justifications as a Non-
Profit Entity 
Courts have consistently viewed the NCAA’s regulatory 
powers as an axe against antitrust scrutiny, with the foundation estab-
lished in Board of Regents acting as the handle.94  The NCAA mar-
kets a unique product, which must combine academics with athletics, 
and the fragile nature of maintaining an association between the two 
is the source of the NCAA’s power.95  Thus, courts consistently rec-
ognize the importance of regulatory measures taken in order to pre-
 
(1978) (noting that league sports require a unique analysis because they are a product that 
can only be carried out jointly)). 
90 Id. at 101 (“[W]hat the NCAA . . . market[s] . . . is competition itself—contest between 
competing institutions . . . this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on 
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed.”).  “By 
participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against 
each other . . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an 
agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another.”  Id. 
at 99. 
91 See id. at 111 (stating that the NCAA argued that the relevant market was the enter-
tainment industry).  An expansive view of the relevant market would not restrict competition 
among broadcasters because they would still be able to compete for all of the programs 
available in the entertainment industry.  Id. 
92 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111-13. 
93 Id. at 111 (finding that the willingness to advertisers to pay more per viewer for college 
football audience demonstrated how unique the product is). 
94 Id. at 101-02 (“The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition differen-
tiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports . . . .  Thus, 
the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character”). 
95 Id. 
14
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serve the integrity of the product.96 
The NCAA’s paramount goal has been the preservation of 
amateurism and regulations which achieve this goal have been uni-
formly upheld as procompetitive.97 The Third Circuit, in Smith v. 
NCAA,98 expressed the importance of ensuring amateurism among 
student athletes because of its effect on fair competition.99  In Smith, 
a college volleyball player was denied her remaining two years of 
athletic eligibility when she enrolled in a post-graduate program at a 
different school than her undergraduate institution..100  The court held 
that the NCAA’s regulation, which prohibited a student-athlete from 
using his or her remaining athletic eligibility while enrolled in a dif-
ferent school’s post-graduate program, was deemed 
procompetitive.101  The rule furthers the NCAA’s goals of amateur-
ism and fair competition by preventing a form of post-graduate re-
cruiting where premier athletic institutions induce student-athletes to 
withhold their athletic eligibility at their undergraduate institution.102 
The NCAA’s regulatory powers are so strong that the court in 
 
96 See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303-04 (D. Mass. 1975) (alleging that an eligi-
bility rule that disqualified a hockey player from participating in intercollegiate athletics was 
an antitrust violation).  The court found no antitrust violation and reasoned that “[t]he 
N.C.A.A. eligibility rules were not designed to coerce students into staying away from inter-
collegiate athletics, but to implement the N.C.A.A. basic principles of amateurism, principles 
which have been at the heart of the Association since its founding.”  Id.; see also Justice, 577 
F. Supp. at 362-63, 383 (challenging NCAA sanctions that excluded the University of Ari-
zona from the television market and postseason competition).  The sanctions were imple-
mented due to a recruiting violation where football players were compensated for their play.  
Id.  The Court found no antitrust violation because the regulation was “rooted in the 
NCAA’s concern for the protection of amateurism.”  Id.; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. 
Supp. 738, 740, 746 (D. Tenn. 1990) (challenging the NCAA’s rule which invalidates a 
player’s eligibility when hiring an agent or entering a professional draft).  The court held that 
the “regulation by the NCAA in fact makes a better ‘product’ available by maintaining the 
educational underpinnings of college football and preserving the stability and integrity of 
college football programs.”  Id.; see also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are procompetitive be-
cause they further the NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athletics). 
97 Id. 
98 139 F.3d 180. 
99 Id. at 187. 
100 Id. at 183-84 (noting that the NCAA allows four years of athletic eligibility and Smith 
was within all eligibility requirements at the time of the case). 
101 Id. at 187 (“[T]he bylaw at issue here is a reasonable restraint which furthers the 
NCAA’s goal of fair competition and the survival of intercollegiate athletics and is thus 
procompetitive.”). 
102 Id.  The regulation also serves the purpose of preventing student-athletes from with-
holding eligibility on their own initiative in order to play at a better athletic institution when 
they are older and have more experience.  Smith, 139 F.3d at 187. 
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Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. NCAA103 held that a restriction 
on an entity not even affiliated with the NCAA did not constitute an 
antitrust violation.104  In Pocono, a top tier basketball camp alleged 
that the NCAA placed an unreasonable restraint on competition by 
requiring the camp to certify with the NCAA in order for Division I 
coaches to visit.105  This clearly places a restriction on the camp be-
cause high school athletes will only sign up for the camp if it pro-
vides adequate recruiting opportunities.106  However, the court af-
forded deference to the fact the NCAA enacted this rule after its 
studies suggested that non-institutional camps exploit campers in the 
recruiting process.107  Thus, the court held that the restriction was 
procompetitive because “when the NCAA promulgated these rules it 
was acting in a paternalistic capacity to promote amateurism and ed-
ucation.”108 
The courts are consistent in applying regulations on recruiting 
and athletic eligibility.109  The Smith and Pocono decisions illustrate 
the importance of NCAA intervention in these concerns because the 
regulations ensure that member institutions do not receive an upper 
hand when attempting to recruit players.110  Because of the concerns 
 
103 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
104 Id. at 583-84.  The NCAA’s regulatory power has also broadened as a result of the out-
come in Pennsylvania v. NCAA.  948 F. Supp. 2d 416 (M.D. Pa. 2013).  The dispute in 
Pennsylvania arose out of the sanctions imposed on Penn State University for the highly 
publicized scandal of Jerry Sandusky.  Id. at 420.  Sandusky, a former Penn State assistant 
football coach, was convicted for the sexual abuse of children, which high-ranking Penn 
State officials failed to report.  Id. at 421.  Despite the plaintiff’s argument that the sanctions 
were not sufficiently tied to athletics, the court relied on Smith and held that the NCAA’s 
regulatory power is not commercial in nature.  Id. at 426-27.  This is troublesome because 
the regulations in Smith were enforced to preserve amateurism, and here they are to punish 
criminal activity that did not involve student-athletes.  Id. at 421; see also Smith, 139 F.3d at 
185. 
105 Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 571-73. 
106 Id. at 575. 
107 Id. at 583-84 (“The NCAA has provided substantial evidence in support of its position 
that the rules were enacted to protect young players from being exploited.”). 
108 Id. at 584.  The NCAA provides in its constitution that it enacts recruiting regulations 
“to promote equity among member institutions in their recruiting of prospects and to shield 
them from undue pressures that may interfere with the . . . athletics interests of the pro-
spects.”  Id. at 572 (quoting NCAA Constitution, Article 2.11). 
109 See supra note 96. 
110 See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (“Rather than intending to provide the NCAA with a 
commercial advantage, the eligibility rules primarily seek to ensure fair competition in inter-
collegiate athletics.”); see, e.g., Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“[T]he prohibition of gifts 
and inducements, and the requirement that camp events not be financed by marketers, are 
grounded in the paternalistic goal of separating high school athletics from the realm of pro-
16
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expressed in Board of Regents, it is unlikely a court will find an anti-
trust violation if the challenged regulation serves the purpose of en-
hancing intercollegiate athletics.111  Therefore, the NCAA’s responsi-
bility for maintaining a clear distinction from professional athletics is 
what stands in the way of student-athlete compensation.112 
B. Ability to Identify a “Relevant Market” 
Another hill that an antitrust claimant must climb is establish-
ing that the challenged NCAA regulation has an anticompetitive ef-
fect within a relevant market.  As noted in Board of Regents, the na-
ture of the NCAA creates a horizontal restraint on trade, which 
requires the court to analyze the effect the contested regulation has on 
the free market.113  Therefore, if the NCAA’s regulation is not com-
mercial in nature, it cannot possibly affect the free market. 
The plaintiff will most likely be deprived of the opportunity to 
identify a relevant market when the NCAA regulation serves a non-
commercial purpose.114  The Third Circuit in Smith held that eligibil-
ity rules are enacted in order to ensure fair competition and are not 
related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.115  The 
Sixth Circuit in Basset v. NCAA116 came to the same determination 
regarding rules that sanction coaches for providing student-athletes 
with improper inducements.117  The court held that regulations pre-
venting the exploitation of student-athletes were non-commercial be-
cause their objective is to ensure competitiveness among member 
schools.118  Therefore, if a regulation does not relate to the NCAA’s 
commercial or business activities, it most likely falls outside the 
 
fessional sports.”). 
111 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
112 Id. at 101-02. 
113 Id. at 113. 
114 See Smith, 139 F.3d at 186-87 (“[T]he Sherman Act primarily was intended to prevent 
unreasonable restraints in ‘business and commercial transactions,’ and therefore has only 
limited applicability to organizations which have principally noncommercial objectives.”); 
see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343 (“Most-if not all-eligibility rules . . . fall comfortably within 
the presumption of procompetitiveness.”). 
115 Smith, 139 F.3d at 185. 
116 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). 
117 Id. at 433. 
118 Id. (“Similar to the eligibility rules in Smith, NCAA’s rules on recruiting student ath-
letes, specifically those rules prohibiting improper inducements and academic fraud, are all 
explicitly non-commercial.”). 
17
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scope of antitrust law.119 
When there is a question as to whether the challenged regula-
tion is commercial in nature, courts will adopt the “reasonable inter-
changeability” standard.120  This test was applied in Worldwide Bas-
ketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA,121 and requires the court to 
analyze whether there are substitute products in a specific market and 
whether there is consumer sensitivity to the substitute products.122  In 
Worldwide Basketball, the challenged regulation imposed a limitation 
on the number of tournaments a basketball team can play within a 
four-year period (Two in Four Rule).123  The court found that the 
“reasonable interchangeability” standard was more appropriate than a 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis, which is only applied when the 
anticompetitive effect within a relevant market is readily apparent.124  
Therefore, when the relevant market is neither obvious nor undisput-
 
119 See id. (holding that “[i]f the rules themselves and the corresponding sanctions are not 
commercial[,] . . . then the enforcement of those rules cannot be commercial”); see also 
Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that eligibility requirements are not subject to the Sherman 
Act because they “are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities.”); 
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law); 
Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304 (holding that eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law). 
120 See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
121 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004). 
122 Id. at 961.  This inquiry establishes a relevant market because it demonstrates that the 
challenged restriction has had an anticompetitive effect within a specific market.  Id.  The 
plaintiff is required to display products that consumers may find interchangeable with the 
product in dispute (i.e., professional football may be considered a substitute product of col-
lege football because both products broadcast the same sport).  Id.  If the court finds that 
consumers will treat the substitute products in a similar fashion then they are considered 
“reasonably interchangeable,” which establishes that competition still exists within the mar-
ket.  Id.  Consumer sensitivity means that consumers will treat the products differently, 
which increases the demand of the product and thus, eliminates competition in the market.  
See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961.  The court also noted that sub-markets may also 
exist “by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket 
as a separate economic entity.”  Id. (quoting Brown Show Co., 370 U.S. at 325). 
123 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957 (contending that the Two in Four Rule limits a 
college basketball team from participating in more than one certified basketball tournament a 
year and no more than two every four years). 
124 Id. at 961 (contending that a quick look rule of reason analysis is appropriate when the 
relevant market is readily apparent to permit the court to identify the market without any in 
depth market analysis).  The court did not believe that a restriction on the number of college 
basketball tournaments a program could participate in qualified for a quick look rule of rea-
son analysis.  Id. at 961.  The court will apply a quick look rule of reason analysis when “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the ar-
rangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”  Id. 
(quoting California Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)). 
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ed, the “reasonable interchangeability” standard will be applied.125 
The Sixth Circuit’s application of the “reasonable inter-
changeability” standard was fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim because the 
plaintiffs presented no evidence of any substitute products.126  The 
plaintiff has the burden of presenting substitute products in order to 
gauge the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct.127  If the 
court finds that consumers will treat substitute products in the market 
similarly, then the products are “reasonably interchangeable,” and 
there has not been an unreasonable restraint on trade.128  Because the 
plaintiffs did not advance any evidence of substitute products that 
demonstrate consumer sensitivity, the court was required to dismiss 
the plaintiffs’ claim.129  However, the court noted “that the Two in 
Four rule has some commercial impact insofar as it regulates games 
that constitute sources of revenue for both the member schools and 
the [plaintiffs].”130  This establishes that although a rule may be en-
acted for a noncommercial purpose, the court may still find that the 
rule has a commercial impact.131 
Case law places a heavy burden on the plaintiff when identi-
fying a relevant market.132  First, the challenged regulation must con-
tain a commercial objective in order to fall within the subject matter 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.133  If the regulation is commercial, 
then the plaintiff must identify substitute or identical products or ser-
vices to gauge the regulation’s anticompetitive effect.134  This process 
permits the court to apply the “reasonable interchangeability” test and 
examine the substitute products to determine if the NCAA regulation 
 
125 See id. (“Under the ‘quick-look’ approach, extensive market and cross-elasticity analy-
sis is not necessarily required, but where . . . the precise product market is neither obvious 
nor undisputed, the failure to account for market alternatives . . . will not suffice.”). 
126 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 963. 
127 Id. at 961. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 963; see Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (noting that the failure to establish a relevant 
market is a ground for dismissal). 
130 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 959. 
131 Id. (“The dispositive inquiry in this regard is whether the rule itself is commercial, not 
whether the entity promulgating the rule is commercial.”). 
132 Id. at 963 (holding that the plaintiff was required to introduce evidence of substitute 
products to gauge the anticompetitive effect in the relevant market); see also Smith, 139 F.3d 
at 185-86 (recognizing that antitrust law has limited applicability to organizations with non-
commercial objectives); see, e.g., Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (“In order to state a claim under 
the Sherman Act there must be a commercial activity implicated.”). 
133 Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-86; see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433. 
134 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961. 
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restrains trade in the market.135  Therefore, ascertaining the relevant 
market is difficult because of the non-commercial objectives of the 
NCAA and the plaintiff’s burden of establishing consumer sensitivity 
to substitute products. 
C. Overcoming Antitrust Barriers 
Not many antitrust claims against the NCAA have been suc-
cessful since the ruling in Board of Regents.136  This is attributed to 
the words of Justice Stevens, concerning the NCAA’s role of main-
taining a distinct line between amateur and professional athletics.137  
Because of the dicta in Board of Regents,138 it is apparent that claims 
concerning eligibility and amateurism face a severe challenge.  How-
ever, as the NCAA’s economic prowess increases, maintaining that 
distinct line will become more difficult. 
The NCAA’s economic success has increased coaches’ sala-
ries, which was the basis of the dispute in Law v. NCAA.139  This suit 
was initiated due to an NCAA regulation that placed a restriction on 
coaches’ salaries.140  The NCAA argued that the rule was implement-
ed in order to maintain competitiveness because schools were starting 
to pay higher salaries for experienced coaches, which certain smaller 
schools could not afford.141  However, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
rule created an unreasonable restraint on trade and provided an inter-
esting analysis that could be beneficial for future claimants.142 
In Law, the court recognized that “[n]o ‘proof of market pow-
er’ is required where the very purpose and effect of a horizontal 
agreement is to fix prices so as to make them unresponsive to a com-
 
135 Id. 
136 See, e.g., Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (holding that regulations that preserve amateurism are 
non-commercial in nature); Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (holding that the recruiting rules 
were implemented to preserve amateurism and were exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Basset, 
528 F.3d at 433 (holding that recruiting rules forbidding improper inducements and academ-
ic violations are non-commercial in nature); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that the 
eligibility rules are not subject to antitrust law); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345 (holding that 
the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are procompetitive because they further the 
NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athletics). 
137 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. 
138 Id. 
139 Law, 134 F.3d at 1012. 
140 Id. at 1015. 
141 Id. at 1014. 
142 See generally id. at 1016-24. 
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petitive marketplace.”143  The court held that the member schools’ 
agreement to restrict coaches’ salaries constituted a horizontal price 
fixing agreement because the agreement eliminated market competi-
tion for assistant football coaches.144  The NCAA did not possess a 
procompetitive justification because it failed to establish that restrict-
ing salaries would enhance competition, level the playing field, or re-
duce coaching inequities.145 
The commercialization of the NCAA has provided student-
athletes with more opportunities to obtain compensation through anti-
trust law.146 This is apparent in existing case law, as the regulation in 
Law was invalidated because the coaches could not compete for 
higher salaries that member institutions were willing to offer.147  Al-
so, the court in Agnew v. NCAA148 noted that because member institu-
tions compete to acquire athletes through “in-kind benefits,” such as 
premier coaches with high salaries and top-tier athletic facilities, a 
“labor market for student-athletes” would satisfy the plaintiffs’ bur-
den of identifying a relevant market.149  Although the plaintiffs’ claim 
involving the NCAA’s restriction that prohibited multi-year athletic 
scholarships was dismissed for the failure to introduce evidence re-
garding a relevant market, the court recognized the commercial im-
pact of regulations which place a restriction on student-athletes.150 
Another case that dealt with a restriction on scholarships is 
NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players’ Litigation,151 in which the 
plaintiffs established Division I athletics as a possible relevant market 
for student-athletes.152  The plaintiffs did not receive scholarships for 
their participation in intercollegiate athletics and claimed that a limi-
tation on the number of athletic scholarships provided was an anti-
trust violation.153  The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
based on the plaintiffs’ allegation that Division I-A football was the 
 
143 Id. at 1020. 
144 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
145 Id. at 1022. 
146 Id. at 1012; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347. 
147 Law, 134 F.3d at 1022. 
148 683 F.3d 328. 
149 Id. at 346-47 (“These are all part of the competitive market to attract student-athletes 
whose athletic labor can result in many benefits for a college, including economic gain.”). 
150 Id. at 347. 
151 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Wash. 2005). 
152 Id. at 1150. 
153 Id. at 1147. 
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relevant market because of the absence of substitute markets in which 
the plaintiffs could fully utilize their skills.154 
The cases discussed in this section may provide student-
athletes with a framework for overcoming the challenges of bringing 
a claim against the NCAA.  The decision in Walk-On Football Play-
ers may permit future claimants to assert Division I as a relevant 
market because it is the only “viable option[] for student[-athletes] 
wishing to make full use of their skills at the highest level of compe-
tition.”155  Furthermore, Agnew establishes a “labor market for stu-
dent-athletes” and demonstrates the commercial nature of a regula-
tion which restricts what college athletes may receive in exchange for 
their athletic commitment.156  Additionally, the court found that 
providing multi-year scholarships would not harm amateurism be-
cause “[i]t is not until payment above and beyond educational costs is 
received that a player is considered a ‘paid athlete.’ ”157  Therefore, 
student-athletes may be able to receive compensation as long as the 
amount they receive is regulated to ensure that it is not in excess of 
educational costs.  Lastly, Law demonstrates that a horizontal agree-
ment to fix prices is unlawful when no procompetitive justification 
exists.158  Currently, the existence of a horizontal agreement to ex-
clude college athletes from collegiate licensing may seem unreasona-
ble when analyzing the size of the market.159 
D. Recent Litigation 
Ed O’Bannon’s current lawsuit against the NCAA and its li-
censing affiliates could have serious implications for the future of the 
NCAA.160  In the class action, antitrust suit, student-athletes seek the 
right to use their names and likenesses in order to enter into licensing 
agreements.161  However, “the (plaintiffs) are not advocating an end 
to the principle of amateurism, nor are they advocating salaries.”162  
 
154 Id. at 1150. 
155 Id. 
156 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346-47. 
157 Id. at 344. 
158 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
159 See generally O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56. 
160 See McCann, supra note 59. 
161 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 2. 
162 Steve Berkowitz, O’Bannon plaintiffs seek summary judgment against NCAA, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/15 
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The complaint alleges that the NCAA has fixed the price of student-
athletes’ images at “zero” and conspired to boycott student-athletes in 
the collegiate licensing market.163 
The nature of O’Bannon’s claim is inherently comparable to a 
right of publicity claim because it alleges the misuse of student-
athletes’ likenesses.164  As a result, the court consolidated 
O’Bannon’s action with a right of publicity claim asserted by former 
Nebraska quarterback, Samuel Michael Keller.165  Keller’s claim is 
similar to the claim asserted in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,166 in 
which EA was found liable for misappropriating the use of a former 
student-athlete’s image.167  Although Keller does not assert an anti-
trust claim, both his and O’Bannon’s claims provide a possible ave-
nue for the compensation of student-athletes through collegiate li-
censing. 
O’Bannon’s claim presents several key issues.  First, compen-
sating student-athletes poses a threat to amateurism.  The Supreme 
Court has already expressed this concern by stating that in order to 
preserve amateurism, student-athletes must not be paid.168  Thus, the 
plaintiffs must work around the words of the Supreme Court.  The 
second challenge the plaintiffs face is identifying a relevant market 
because the NCAA has the non-commercial objective of preserving 
amateurism.  Courts may find that no relevant market exists because 
the regulations that bar student-athletes from receiving compensation 
are not commercial in nature.  Potential means of addressing these is-
sues are discussed in the next section. 
The NCAA currently has its hands full, as another recently 
filed complaint alleges that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the 
 
/ncaa-ed-obannon-lawsuit-name-and-likeness-summary-judgement/3598497/. 
163 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 32. 
164 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 151 (holding that the right of publicity protects individuals’ 
property rights to their image). 
165 Dennis Dodd, Keller lawsuit vs. gamer EA Sports, NCAA clears major hurdle, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 31, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer 
/dennis-dodd/22954567/keller-lawsuit-vs-gamer-ea-sports-and-ncaa-clears-major-hurdle. 
166 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).  The plaintiff was a quarterback for the University of 
Rutgers and brought an action against EA, alleging a violation of the right of publicity for 
the misappropriation of his likeness in a college football video game.  Id. at 145.  The court 
held that EA violated Hart’s right of publicity because of the use of his recognizable features 
in a game that involved the same activity.  Id. at 169. 
167 Id. at 170. 
168 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. 
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Sherman Act by unreasonably capping athletic scholarships.169  This 
class action was brought by former West Virginia running back, 
Shawn Alston, claiming that the NCAA has capped scholarships at a 
price much lower than the costs to attend an institution.170  In his 
complaint, Alston alleges that during his collegiate career he had to 
take out a loan to cover the actual cost of attendance.171  This claim is 
similar to the one asserted in Agnew, which alleged that denying ath-
letes multi-year scholarships constitutes an antitrust violation.172  Alt-
hough the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed for failure to produce suffi-
cient evidence, Agnew may support Alston’s claim because the court 
stated that “[t]he proper identification of a labor market for student-
athletes . . . would meet the plaintiffs’ burden of describing a cog-
nizable market.”173 
The argument still remains whether the NCAA has exceeded 
the scope of its authority by placing the specified economic re-
strictions on student-athletes.  The recent antitrust suits attempt to 
lessen the NCAA’s regulatory power which shield it from antitrust 
scrutiny. 
V. ANTITRUST APPROACH TO STUDENT-ATHLETE 
COMPENSATION 
The thought of paying student-athletes will make the NCAA 
and its members cringe because of the threat it poses to amateurism.  
However, a larger concern is that compensation would deplete the 
revenue of the NCAA and its member schools.  Regardless of the 
NCAA’s motive, an antitrust litigant must overcome the precedent 
that protects the NCAA’s regulatory power of preserving amateur-
 
169 Martin Rickman, Former West Virginia player files lawsuit against the NCAA for cap-
ping scholarship value, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 5, 2014), http://college-football.si.com 
/2014/03/05/ncaa-lawsuit-shawne-alston-antitrust/. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332.  The plaintiffs in this action were injured during their partici-
pation in collegiate athletics and as a result did not receive a scholarship for their entire aca-
demic career.  Id. at 347.  The facts surrounding this dispute may suggest that a scholarship 
is not adequate compensation for student-athletes. 
173 Id. at 346-47.  The court expressed that a restriction on scholarships can have an anti-
competitive effect because schools engage in a competitive market to attract student-athletes.  
Id.  The labor market for student-athletes is competitive in nature because “the pay involves 
in-kind benefits as opposed to cash.”  Id.  For instance, institutions compete for top-tier 
coaches and invest a significant amount of money in its athletic facilities to obtain premier 
athletes in order to benefit its athletic program.  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347. 
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ism.174 
Despite these concerns, compensating college athletes may 
actually preserve amateurism more successfully than the strict regula-
tions that are currently in effect.  College athletes in dire need of fi-
nancial assistance are often confronted with the temptation of accept-
ing enticements to attend an institution or participate in point shaving 
scandals.175  In order to enforce its regulations, the NCAA is mandat-
ed to investigate and penalize such activity.176  Consequently, the in-
vestigations that surface result in a negative conception of the NCAA 
because they expose the public to the corruption and unfair practices 
that exist in intercollegiate athletics.177  As the NCAA’s revenue con-
tinues to rise, student-athletes will assert a greater entitlement to 
compensation and improper inducements will continue.  Easing the 
burden on student-athletes might deter this sort of illegal activity and 
ensure fair competition among member institutions.  This section ex-
plores how student-athletes can procure compensation through the 
use of antitrust law and how the NCAA can monetize its product 
without eliminating the fundamental principle of amateurism. 
A. The NCAA’s Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act 
Existing precedent favors the NCAA.178  Nevertheless, the 
NCAA has developed immense market power in the thirty years fol-
lowing the decision in Board of Regents.179  Thus, some power has 
 
174 See Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304 (holding that eligibility rules are procompetitive be-
cause they preserve amateurism); see also Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 (holding that recruit-
ing rules are immune from antitrust scrutiny because they preserve amateurism); see also 
Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that an eligibility “regulation by the NCAA in fact 
makes a better ‘product’ available by maintaining the educational underpinnings of college 
football and preserving stability and integrity of college football programs.”); see also 
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345 (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” rules are 
procompetitive because they further the NCAA’s goal of integrating academics with athlet-
ics). 
175 See, e.g., Rob Dauster, FBI: San Diego point-shaving scandal netted ‘more than 
$120,000, NBC SPORTS (May 22, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.co 
m/2013/05/22/fbi-san-diegos-brandon-johnson-paid-up-to-10000-per-game-to-shave-points/ 
(stating that a former San Diego point guard was sentenced to six months in prison for his 
role in a point shaving scandal during the 2009-2010 season when he received up to $10,000 
a game); see, e.g., supra note 7. 
176  Id. 
177 See, e.g., Dauster, supra note 175. 
178 See, supra note 174. 
179 See, e.g,, Berkowitz, supra note 47; see, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 92-93 (stating 
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swung in favor of the plaintiffs because it is unlikely that the 
NCAA’s economic growth will go unnoticed when resolving an anti-
trust claim. 
Although the largest portion of the NCAA’s revenue derives 
from its television broadcasts,180 an attempt to receive a portion of 
this revenue through antitrust law will most likely be futile.  Because 
it is the NCAA and member institutions that engage in broadcast con-
tracts, student-athletes cannot allege that they are excluded from the 
broadcasting market.  This is analogous to professional sports, where 
the professional organization and its members enter into broadcasting 
contracts, and the revenue contributes to part of a professional ath-
lete’s salary.181  If student-athletes were to receive a portion of the 
NCAA’s television revenue, it would require them to receive a salary 
on top of their scholarship, which would undoubtedly destroy ama-
teurism. 
Claims involving the use of student-athletes’ likenesses are 
distinguishable because the NCAA has precluded individual student-
athletes from pursuing compensation in a competitive marketplace 
through the use of their images.182  Excluding student-athletes from 
the market may influence courts to find that the prohibition on their 
property rights unreasonable.  However, if student-athletes receive 
compensation, a detailed analysis is required to overcome the ama-
teurism concerns associated with paying players. 
The size of the market from which current and former stu-
dent-athletes are excluded will contribute to the strength of a claim in 
an action pursuing the rights to student-athletes’ images.  For in-
stance, IMG Worldwide, the owner of the CLC, states on its website 
that it “manag[es] the licensing rights for nearly 200 leading institu-
tions that represent more than $3 billion in retail sales and more than 
75% share of the college licensing market.”183  Moreover, the use of a 
student-athlete’s likeness can extend beyond the sale of jerseys and 
apparel to the sale of game-footage to advertisers, classic games that 
have been re-aired, and the sale of photographs and DVDs.184  The 
 
that networks were able to negotiate directly with member schools for television rights for a 
minimum aggregate compensation of $131,750,000 over a four-year period). 
180  Berkowitz, supra note 47. 
181 See Huma, supra note 17, at 11 (stating that NFL players are guaranteed to receive at 
least 46.5% percent of the revenue generated by the league). 
182 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 2. 
183 Id. at 7. 
184 Id. at 15. 
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NCAA has developed immense market power in collegiate licensing 
because it has sole possession of student-athletes’ images in a market 
with no competitors. 
In an antitrust suit, which alleges an unreasonable restriction 
on the use of names and likenesses of student-athletes, the plaintiff 
will easily satisfy the first element.185  The existence of a contract is 
obvious based upon the member schools’ agreement to adhere to the 
bylaws, as well as the student-athletes’ requirement to sign Form 08-
3a.186 
Although the first element does not pose a threat to claimants 
in an action against the NCAA, plaintiffs may also be able to demon-
strate a conspiracy among the NCAA, CLC, and EA to satisfy this el-
ement.  Form 08-3a incorporates NCAA bylaw 12.5.1.1.1, which 
permits the NCAA to use the image of a “student-athlete to generally 
promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or 
programs.”187  This is overly broad language because “generally 
promot[ing the] NCAA” may extend to any licensing deal because it 
will generate consumer interest through the increased exposure of the 
brand.  This may establish a conspiracy because it provides the 
NCAA and its affiliates, EA and CLC, with the power to control the 
collegiate licensing market through deals that misappropriate ath-
letes’ images. 
The second element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an 
anticompetitive effect within a relevant market; therefore, the chal-
lenged regulation must first be commercial in nature.188  The courts in 
Smith and Basset found no competitive effect on the market because 
the challenged regulations did not relate to the NCAA’s commercial 
or business activities.189  However, these regulations were purely reg-
ulatory measures to ensure fair competition, and the NCAA did not 
receive any profit as a result of its enforcement of the regulations.190  
 
185 See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the first element requires “a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy”). 
186 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335 
(“There is no question that all NCAA member schools have agreed to abide by the Bylaws; 
the first showing of an agreement or contract is therefore not at issue in this case.”). 
187 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 11. 
188 Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-86. 
189 Id. at 185; Basset, 528 F.3d at 433. 
190 Smith, 139 F.3d at 185 (noting that the NCAA cannot profit from denying the plain-
tiff’s athletic eligibility); see also Basset, 528 F.3d at 433 (holding that rules preventing aca-
demic fraud are not commercial and the NCAA could not profit from the suspension of a 
coach). 
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The court in Agnew noted that “the Sherman Act applies to commer-
cial transactions, and the modern definition of commerce includes 
‘almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic 
gain.’ ”191  Because the NCAA may use a student-athlete’s likeness to 
“generally promote [the] NCAA,” the regulation is commercial in na-
ture.192  The NCAA can reasonably anticipate an economic gain as a 
result of the restriction it places on student-athletes because it may 
use their images for promotional purposes, which ultimately increas-
es consumer interest in the product. 
Because the regulation is commercial in nature, the plaintiff 
must then demonstrate that it has an “anticompetitive effect” within a 
“relevant market.”193  However, according to the court in Law, no 
proof of market power is needed when a horizontal agreement to fix 
prices makes a product unresponsive to competition.194  Form 08-3a 
is a horizontal agreement because the member institutions, which 
compete against one another, have essentially agreed to fix the price 
of student-athletes’ images at zero.195   
Pursuant to this agreement, college athletes relinquish the 
right to the use of their likeness, which prohibits them from compet-
ing in the collegiate licensing market.196  In order for the plaintiff to 
be relieved of its burden of identifying a relevant market, the court 
must find that the agreement to fix student-athlete compensation sim-
ilar to Law, where assistant coaches could not respond to competition 
because their salaries were fixed at a maximum price.197  Because a 
horizontal agreement exists that completely excludes student-athletes 
from the market, the NCAA’s market power in the collegiate licens-
ing market will most likely be presumed.198 
Despite the horizontal agreement to fix prices, if the court 
finds that the anticompetitive effect is not readily apparent because 
licensing companies may still compete with one another it will apply 
 
191 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340 (quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1260b, at 
250 (2000)). 
192 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 11. 
193 Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063. 
194 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
195 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3. 
196 Id. 
197 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
198 See id. (noting that a horizontal agreement to fix prices requires the court to apply a 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis where the plaintiff is not required to identify a relevant 
market). 
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the “reasonable interchangeability” test.199  Still, a claimant will most 
likely be able to demonstrate consumer sensitivity to consumer prod-
ucts because, as mentioned in Board of Regents, the NCAA markets a 
unique product that is distinct from all other products because it 
combines athletics with academics.200  This uniqueness provides the 
NCAA with market power in the collegiate licensing market because 
no “reasonable interchangeability” exists that causes consumers to 
differentiate intercollegiate athletics from other athletic products.201  
Furthermore, Walk on Football Players Litigation recognizes that a 
single product market may be sufficient when no substitute markets 
exist,202 and the collegiate licensing market provides student-athletes 
with the only viable option to utilize the use of their names and like-
nesses. 
The greatest challenge that a plaintiff faces is demonstrating 
an unreasonable restraint on trade that outweighs the NCAA’s 
procompetitive justification of preserving amateurism.203  The plain-
tiff will be able establish an unreasonable restraint on trade due to the 
complete market power that the NCAA possesses over the collegiate 
licensing market.  By fixing student-athletes’ images at zero, the 
NCAA has retained complete control of its athletes’ likenesses, thus, 
allowing it to exclude competition from the market.  A restriction ex-
ists because a competitor must deal solely with the NCAA and its 
member institutions, which possess ultimate control of the price and 
output of the product.  Litigating this issue will require the plaintiff to 
introduce specific evidence regarding the profits attributable to the 
NCAA’s control over the market and the effect of the lack of compe-
tition in the market. 
The NCAA is justified in restricting competition because pre-
serving amateurism is essential to maintain the integrity of its prod-
uct.204  In order for the restriction on competition to outweigh the 
 
199 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961. 
200 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02. 
201 See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961 (noting that if the plaintiff introduced pro-
fessional football as a football product the court would find that there is not “reasonable in-
terchangeability” between the two products because of the NCAA’s uniqueness, which pro-
vides them with complete market power). 
202 Walk on Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
203 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.  Because the NCAA is justified in restricting 
competition in order to preserve amateurism the courts will most likely conduct this inquiry 
under a Rule of Reason analysis.  Id. at 117. 
204 Id. at 102. 
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NCAA’s justification to curtail competition, a plaintiff must work 
around the language of the Supreme Court in Board of Regents, 
which noted that student-athletes should not be paid and that the 
NCAA has the power to restrict competition if the regulation serves 
the purpose of enhancing public interest in intercollegiate athletics.205  
To overcome this language, a plaintiff must emphasize that the words 
are mere dicta from nearly thirty years ago when the economic 
growth of the NCAA could not be predicted.  Although the NCAA’s 
revenue has risen sharply in the last thirty years, paying athletes still 
poses a threat to amateurism.  If agents are involved in the process 
and players are competing for compensation, the NCAA will morph 
into a professional league. 
Board of Regents established that the proper inquiry to deter-
mine if there has been an antitrust violation is to analyze whether the 
challenged regulation enhances or restricts the NCAA.206  Although 
ensuring amateurism enhances the product, not every NCAA regula-
tion may promote this purpose.207  Permitting student-athletes to use 
their own images does not necessarily destroy amateurism if the use 
is strictly regulated. 
The exclusion of student-athletes from the collegiate licensing 
market also places an unreasonable restriction on intercollegiate 
sports because of its negative effect on consumers.  The NCAA owns 
complete market power of collegiate licensing and has granted the 
CLC 75% of the market, which prohibits competitors from entering 
the market and providing an alternative service that may be more ap-
pealing to certain consumers.208  Thus, the NCAA’s market power 
has harmed consumers because without competition in the market the 
NCAA has complete control over prices and output, which precludes 
collegiate licensing companies from conforming to consumer prefer-
ences.  Additionally, consumers wish to support their favorite play-
ers, and prohibiting the use of student-athletes’ images prevents con-
sumers from owning any apparel containing a specific student-
athlete’s surname. 
As the NCAA continues to grow economically, players may 
believe the use of their images unjustly enriches the organization and 
 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 120. 
207 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
208 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 7. 
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their acceptance of improper inducements will persist.209  Allowing 
student-athletes to pursue compensation in a regulated manner might 
act as a deterrent because a penalty for receiving improper induce-
ments would diminish the value of a student-athlete’s likeness. 
An argument can also be made that the NCAA has tarnished 
its image as a regulator of amateur athletics through the mistreatment 
of its student-athletes.  It is immediately apparent to an observer that 
the NCAA’s revenue stream is completely dependent on its athletes.  
Meanwhile, anyone who follows college sports is likely aware of the 
billions of dollars that the NCAA receives for its broadcast rights.  In 
addition, the NCAA and its affiliates have sold products that misap-
propriate student-athletes’ images, such as NCAA football video 
games, which contain all of the features of college players except for 
their names.210  There has been widespread criticism of the NCAA’s 
exploitation of its athletes and the failure to take any action recogniz-
ing student-athletes’ contribution will continue to tarnish the 
NCAA’s reputation.211  For many student-athletes, intercollegiate ath-
letics might be the only time that their image has any value, but Form 
08-3a requires them to relinquish all rights to their names and like-
nesses.212  Although permitting student-athletes to pursue compensa-
tion through the use of their name and likenesses poses a threat to 
amateurism, courts may find that the increase in the NCAA’s revenue 
has exploited student-athletes and resulted in an adverse impact on 
the nation’s view of the NCAA. 
Former student-athletes are more likely to prevail under anti-
trust law.  The NCAA does not possess any procompetitive justifica-
tion for its horizontal agreement, which forces student-athletes to re-
linquish their rights to their images in perpetuity.  Barring the use of 
their likenesses, which they developed in college, does not serve the 
purpose of ensuring amateurism or fair competition when they are no 
longer subject to NCAA regulations.  This is comparable to Law be-
cause former student-athletes are subject to a horizontal price fixing 
agreement that makes their property rights unresponsive to competi-
tion.213  For instance, former Boston College football star Doug Flut-
ie’s most memorable moment is a Hail Mary pass that was completed 
 
209 See, e.g., Dauster, supra note 175. 
210 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 169. 
211 See, e.g., Deitsch, supra note 12. 
212 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3. 
213 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
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on the last play of the game to win the 1984 Orange Bowl.214  Alt-
hough Flutie no longer has any affiliation with the NCAA, he may 
not be compensated for any playback of that video for which he is 
best known.215  Thus, the perpetuity requirement under NCAA by-
laws should not withstand an antitrust challenge because it unreason-
ably restrains former student-athletes from competing in the colle-
giate licensing market. 
This section demonstrates that the NCAA’s economic success 
may have detrimental effects to amateurism.  If the courts believe that 
the NCAA has tarnished amateurism through its own actions, they 
will most likely find the NCAA’s justifications for restricting compe-
tition less persuasive.  Thus, arguments that demonstrate how the 
commercialization of the NCAA has hurt intercollegiate athletics will 
benefit antitrust claimants.  For instance, student-athletes’ propensity 
to accept improper inducements and the exploitation of student-
athletes in licensing agreements may contribute to destruction of the 
NCAA’s appearance of amateurism.  As a consequence of the 
NCAA’s economic growth, change is imminent, and in order for stu-
dent-athletes to be compensated, a plan must be implemented that 
will not destroy amateurism. 
B. Solution to Compensating Student-Athletes 
Without Destroying Amateurism 
Prohibiting players from receiving compensation raises sever-
al fairness issues that provide insight into the controversy of whether 
student-athletes are entitled to any benefits outside of a scholarship.  
Several commentators have conducted a market analysis on the value 
of NCAA athletes by comparing their worth to professional ath-
letes.216  This analysis was first conducted by examining professional 
leagues’ collective bargaining agreements, which provide that Na-
tional Football League players must receive at least 46.5% of the rev-
enue generated by the league.217  This percentage was applied to the 
revenue reported by member institutions minus the cost of a scholar-
 
214 Rick Wienberg, 9: Doug Flutie’s Hail Mary beats Miami, 47-45, ESPN.COM, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/espn25/story?page=moments/9. 
215 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that Form 08-3a relinquishes 
student-athletes’ likenesses “in perpetuity”). 
216 Huma, supra note 17, at 10. 
217 Id. at 11. 
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ship to assess the fair market value of college players.218  The study 
illustrated that in 2011, Division I football players lost an average of 
$456,612 over a four-year period.219 
A “full-ride” scholarship coupled with the concern for ama-
teurism does not justify the prohibition on student-athlete compensa-
tion.  A “full ride” scholarship under NCAA bylaws “consists of tui-
tion and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”220  
However, this does not include other expenses that are related to at-
tending the institution, such as transportation and school supplies.221  
During the 2011-2012 season, these expenses for Division I football 
players averaged $3,285.222  Allowing student-athletes to pursue 
compensation to cover their out of pocket expenses would actually 
provide them with a “full grant in aid” to attend the institution.223 
Reform is necessary to bridge the gap between the NCAA’s 
increasing revenue and college athletes’ stagnant position.  The fail-
ure to accommodate its athletes can pose great threats to the NCAA, 
as its not-for-profit status requires it to act in the best interests of its 
student-athletes.224  While the status of college athletes remains stag-
nant, coaches’ salaries are increasing at a rate higher than corporate 
executives,225 member institutions are developing athletic complexes 
valued in the hundreds of millions,226 and television ratings are reach-
ing the equivalent of those for professional sports.227  The failure to 
 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 12. 
220 Id. at 11. 
221 Huma, supra note 17, at 11. 
222 Id. 
223 Id.  The NCAA has attempted to bridge this gap by approving a plan that provides stu-
dent-athletes with unlimited food.  Zach Schonbrun, The N.C.A.A. Ensures Athletes Will Get 
All They Can Eat, NYTIMES.COM (April 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/spo 
rts/ncaa-ensures-athletes-will-get-all-they-can-eat.html.  The plan was put into place shortly 
after 2014 College Basketball Champion, Shabazz Napier, expressed his concerns “that he 
sometimes went to bed starving because his money ran out or the three-meal allowance was 
not enough to fuel his calorie-melting training.”  Id.  
224 Wieberg, supra note 82. 
225 Huma, supra note 17, at 6. 
226 Brian Bennett, Facilities arms races proves recession proof, ESPN.COM (June 14, 
2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8047787/college-football-facilities-
arms-race-proves-recession-proof (noting that Michigan University completed a $226 mil-
lion dollar renovation of its stadium in 2010). 
227 See, e.g., Dominick Patten, NCAA Championship Game Ratings Up 18% Over Last 
Year, DEADLINE.COM (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.deadline.com/2013/04/ncaa-championship-
ratings-louisville-michigan-final/; see, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Game 7 of N.B.A. Finals 
Draws High TV Ratings, NY TIMES, Jun. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/sp 
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amend its bylaws can expose the NCAA to even more litigation and 
put its not-for-profit status in jeopardy. 
Providing college athletes with the right to their likenesses is 
the best solution to this problem.  Many states recognize that an indi-
vidual’s likeness is a property right because the individual has devel-
oped the value of his or her image through hard work.228  This essen-
tially means that the NCAA deprives its athletes of their own 
property by requiring them to sign Form 08-3a, at a time when there 
image is possibly at its highest point. 
Lifting the restriction on student-athletes’ intellectual property 
rights will not remove all of the issues confronting the NCAA.  
Clearly, the biggest issue is maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate 
athletics.  To address this concern, the monetary incentives received 
for the use of athletes’ images must be capped.  The NCAA should 
conduct a study to determine the out of pocket expenses of college 
athletes that are associated with attending school.  Therefore, ama-
teurism will not be affected because the compensation will still be re-
lated to academic purposes.  In addition, the NCAA is not violating 
its own “no pay for play” policy because the players are receiving the 
benefit of their own property rather than compensation from the 
NCAA. 
The thought of corporate advertisers dealing directly with stu-
dent-athletes also poses a threat to amateurism.  The NCAA bylaws 
prohibit a player from consulting with an agent while the player still 
has athletic eligibility.229  This results in a conflict because corporate 
advertisers should not deal directly with individuals who do not have 
expertise in negotiating contracts.  Allowing agents to help negotiate 
these contracts would not only violate NCAA regulations, but would 
also harm amateurism because of the agents’ economic interest in the 
professional careers of student-athletes.  The NCAA can resolve this 
conflict by acting as liaison for college athletes, which eliminates 
student-athletes from pursuing professional representation.  
Another major concern is that this policy will result in the 
disparate treatment of student-athletes because sponsors will only pay 
for top-tier athletes.  To address this, student-athletes should receive a 
percentage of any licensing deal by the NCAA, which incorporates 
their likenesses or images.  For example, a percentage of the revenue 
 
orts/basketball/game-7-of-nba-finals-draws-high-tv-ratings.html?_r=0. 
228 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 151. 
229 Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740. 
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that the NCAA receives in a video game deal with EA or through the 
licensing of players’ jerseys should be pooled and distributed to stu-
dent-athletes evenly in their respective sport.  Therefore, every ath-
lete will receive some sort of compensation, and the restriction on the 
amount players may receive all but eliminates any disparity among 
athletes.  Moreover, the NCAA will be able to conform to consumer 
preferences by entering into licensing deals without misappropriating 
its athletes’ images. 
In addition to the solutions proposed, the NCAA should allow 
athletes who make more than the calculated out of pocket expenses to 
be eligible to receive the excess amount of money after their colle-
giate career.  This prevents the misappropriation of student-athletes’ 
likenesses if the NCAA engages in group licensing deals that result in 
profits for college athletes in excess of the capped amount.  The 
NCAA may also require athletes to surrender all money left in es-
crow, as well as relinquish the rights to their likenesses for receiving 
improper inducements.  This can act as a strong deterrent on top of 
the existing punishments that the NCAA already enforces because 
athletes will not want to risk possible suspensions when they are al-
ready being compensated.  Also, putting the money in escrow does 
not pose a threat to amateurism because student-athletes will be com-
pensated at the cessation of their amateur careers.  However, there 
must be a limitation on the amount college athletes may receive upon 
the termination of their athletic eligibility.  This will prevent a large 
disparity in compensation among student-athletes and the over-
endorsement of marketable players. 
The final issue which must be addressed is that the imple-
mented restrictions proposed still constitute a horizontal agreement 
that fix student-athletes’ prices.  This horizontal agreement, however, 
will survive antitrust scrutiny because of the NCAA’s procompetitive 
justification of preserving amateurism.  This is not an unreasonable 
restraint on trade because student-athletes are being compensated 
through reasonable means.  Without restrictions, advertisers would 
sign the most talented players to lucrative endorsement deals, which 
would undoubtedly turn the NCAA into a professional league. 
This proposal has advantages over other recommendations.  
One idea, implemented for a brief time by the NCAA, provides col-
lege athletes with a stipend to cover out of pocket expenses.230  There 
 
230 Young, supra note 18, at 352. 
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are several issues that a stipend creates, which is possibly why the 
idea was struck down in 2012.231  First, a stipend would clearly vio-
late the NCAA’s no pay for play policy, which can be distinguished 
from the proposed solution because it provides athletes with compen-
sation through their own property rights.  Second, Title IX requires 
the equal treatment of men and women’s sports.232  This would re-
quire member institutions to provide extra funding for women’s ath-
letic programs that do not generate the same revenue that men’s foot-
ball and basketball generate.233  Although there will be a disparity 
among men and women, the proposed solution confers intellectual 
property rights on all students and does not discriminate between men 
and women.  Finally, if the NCAA implements a stipend it will still 
be subject to antitrust scrutiny because a horizontal agreement to fix 
athletes’ prices at zero will remain.  This will become even more 
problematic as the NCAA’s revenue in the collegiate licensing mar-
ket continues to grow. 
The suit brought by Alston, regarding the alleged restriction 
on scholarship funds, also suggests a solution that will not harm ama-
teurism because the amount student-athletes may receive only 
equates to a full grant in aid.234  However, this creates many similar 
issues because the excess money required for scholarships will come 
out of the institutions budget rather than a third party’s pocket.  An 
institution will also be required to provide this inflated scholarship to 
every athlete due to Title IX regulations.  Ninety six percent of the 
revenue that the NCAA receives is redistributed to its member insti-
tutions, and a method of compensation that cuts into this funding may 
require schools to reduce other athletic programs that do not generate 
revenue. 
The student-athletes of Northwestern University have also 
taken a unique approach in an attempt to profit from their fair market 
value.235  The Northwestern athletes have filed to unionize with aspi-
rations that the National Labor Relations Board will recognize them 
as employee-athletes instead of student-athletes.236  If the players’ un-
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232 Id. at 353. 
233 Id. 
234 See Rickman, supra note 169. 
235 Lester Munson, Player-union attempt gets under way, ESPN.COM (Feb. 12, 2014, 
11:42 AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10433422/northwestern-university 
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ionization attempt is upheld, then the players will be given the right 
to bargain for benefits from the NCAA.237  However, the major con-
cern associated with this attempt is that the NCAA will retain im-
mense bargaining power.  In a collective bargaining agreement, one 
of the negotiation chips that the union holds is the ability to strike if it 
believes it is being treated unfairly.  If student-athletes wished to 
strike, they would be required to forego their education. 
In sum, the best reform that the NCAA can implement is al-
lowing athletes to seek compensation through the use of their like-
nesses.  However, the compensation that these athletes receive must 
be limited in order to preserve amateurism.  The most effective meth-
od is to prohibit student-athletes from receiving compensation that 
exceeds the out of pocket expenses during their collegiate careers.  
Any additional money should be put in escrow for athletes to receive 
after they no longer have athletic eligibility.  The excess amount must 
also be limited to whatever the NCAA deems fit in order to prevent a 
large disparity among student-athletes and ensure that certain institu-
tions cannot become more marketable than others.  Also, the NCAA 
has a fiduciary duty to its student-athletes and should act as a liaison 
to prevent the exploitation of its athletes.  This proposed method will 
result in the proportional compensation of athletes based on the reve-
nue they generate for the NCAA and its member institutions.  Stu-
dent-athletes would no longer be deprived of their property and the 
NCAA could continue its prominence as a regulator of amateur ath-
letics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Dollar signs are ruining a product that was initially created to 
provide a safe outlet for young adults wishing to compete against one 
another athletically.  Instead of acting in the student-athletes’ best in-
terests, member institutions have clearly become motivated by eco-
nomic concerns.  A prime example is Syracuse’s departure from the 
Big East Conference to pursue a more lucrative economic opportuni-
ty in the Atlantic Coast Conference.238  Syracuse disregarded the tra-
dition and rivalries it had developed over a 34 year period for a big-
 
237 Id. 
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ger paycheck.239 
Is it right to suspend Johnny Manziel, a former Heisman Tro-
phy winner, for allegedly receiving compensation for his autograph, 
while the NCAA generates revenue through the sale of his jersey?  
Manziel worked hard for his signature to have value but may not 
benefit from it in any way.  Meanwhile, the NCAA is a not-for-profit 
entity, exempt from taxes, but generates revenue from its athletes’ 
jerseys.240  It seems impossible for this issue to go unnoticed as the 
disparity increases between the NCAA’s revenue and student-
athletes’ compensation in the form of their scholarships.  The NCAA 
and its member institutions should reward athletes for their accom-
plishments while maintaining its foundational principles. 
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